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In this paper several definitions of probabilistic causation are considered, and their main 
drawbacks discussed. Current notions of probabilistic causality have symmetry limitations (e.g. 
correlation and statistical dependence are symmetric notions). To avoid the symmetry problem, 
non-reciprocal causality is often defined in terms of dynamic asymmetry. But these notions are 
likely to consider spurious regularities. In this paper we present a definition of causality that does 
not have symmetry inconsistencies. It is a natural extension of propositional causality in formal 
logics, and it can be easily analyzed with statistical inference. The modeling problems are also 
discussed using empirical processes. 
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 INTRODUCTION
The aim of science is ﬁrst to determine whether a set of axiomatic events or propositions can
be accepted as true, and then to derive the validity of more complex facts establishing causality
relationships. As Wold (1954) pointed out: “The concept of causality is indispensable and funda-
mental to all sciences”. But these axiomatic events and causal implications can be deterministic
(invariable) regularities or be deﬁned in terms of indeterministic (probabilistic) regularities. Proba-
bilistic causality is a diﬃcult topic, involving the controversial issues of certainty (irrevocability) of
ac a u s e - e ﬀect relationship, and the connection of causality with theories of induction.
In “formal logic” (in the deterministic context), a proposition A causes B if when A is true then
B is also true, and we denote this fact by A ⇒ B. Another expression for “A causes B” is that B is
necessary for A. It is also said that both propositions are equivalent when A ⇒ B and also B ⇒ A,
a n dt h i si sd e n o t e db yA ⇔ B. It means that, by deﬁnition, causality is an asymmetric concept,
and symmetry results into equivalence. Earman (1986) provides an introduction to determinism
in physics. A drawback of this causality deﬁnition is that it cannot be applied to indeterministic
contexts. Bertrand Russel (1913, 1948) criticised the deterministic concept of causation. He argues
that the world is complex, and even though causal laws might hold true, they often fail because of
preventing circumstances, and the fact that it is impractical to bring in innumerable “unless” clauses.
But, in spite of the high complexity in the world, there are also causal lines of quasi-permanence
that warrant our inferences. For instance, the statement “smoke causes lung cancer” is false when
the logical deﬁnition is used, but we can ﬁnd empirical regularities suggesting this eﬀect, see e.g.
Suppes (1970). Causality relationships are usually due to a constellation of factors that are jointly
suﬃcient for B, where A is a relevant causal factor but not suﬃcient to ensure B. The complexity of
the surrounding factors can be addressed by probability theory. For a discussion of indeterminism
and causation see Humpreys (1989).
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Probabilistic Causation” designates a
group of philosophical theories that aim to characterize the relationship between cause and eﬀect
using the tools of probability theory. The central idea behind these theories is that causes raise the
probabilities of their eﬀects, ceteris paribus. This idea has been formalized in a variety of deﬁnitions,
but often they are aﬀected by symmetry (e.g., a high correlation between two random variables is
a symmetric notion). To reduce the symmetry problem, some of these causality notions have been
modiﬁed introducing conditional probabilities to some speciﬁce v e n t . B u tt h e s er e ﬁnements are
2not entirely satisfactory. Mackie (1974), Lewis (1986), and Hausman (1998) discuss diﬀerent issues
about asymmetry of causation.
To avoid symmetry, some philosophers have deﬁned causality from a dynamic perspective , arguing
that causes are invariably followed by their eﬀects and therefore causation should be considered in
terms of stable patterns of succession (see e.g. David Hume, 1748, section VII.) Following Hume,
some proponents of probabilistic theories of causation have identiﬁed causal direction with temporal
direction. But, a deﬁnition of causality based on dynamic regularities is likely to consider spurious
regularities. For example, we observe that lightning is often followed by thunder, but the ﬁrst does
not cause the second, both are simultaneously caused by the same electric phenomena. However, even
using dynamic speciﬁcations we can ﬁnd vicious circularities (symmetries) that have to be avoided
by ruling out the possibility of backwards-in-time causation a priori. Even without backwards-
in-time causation, spurious associations are relevant (e.g., the sustained increment in atmospheric
carbon dioxide during the last century correlates with posterior earth average warming which is often
interpreted as a causal eﬀect and explained using a greenhouse analogy, whereas for other authors
it is a spurious association and the global warming trend marks the arrival of a glaciation period).
Besides, the logical notion A ⇒ B does not require the use of time, and we should require the same
generality for any valid deﬁnition of probabilistic causation.
Overall, the current deﬁnitions of probabilistic causation can be objected, because they lack a
sound logical basis, and/or involve symmetry (e.g., statistical dependence), and/or time-delay re-
quirements which limit the general applicability. Probabilistic causality is still an undeﬁned concept.
However, it has a crucial relevance for scientists. The falsiﬁcationist theory of Karl Popper considers
that a physical theory can be falsiﬁed if it can be rejected based on contradiction with empirical ob-
servation. In a deterministic context a simple counterexample can be used to reject a causal theory,
but not in the context of probabilistic causality. Without a valid theory of probabilistic causality,
empirical induction cannot give scientists clear rules to reject causal relationships.
This paper proposes a probabilistic theory of causation which does not suﬀer from any of these
drawbacks. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the previous developments
on probabilistic causation are discussed. In section 3, I propose a new concept of probabilistic
causation, based on logic that is not aﬀected by symmetry or time delay requirements, and consider
asymptotic forms of causation. Section 4 introduces the empirical analysis of probabilistic causation.
In Section 5 I present central concepts relating modelling causal analysis and statistical inference. In
the concluding remarks section, I discuss how causal relationships can be used for optimal decision
3making.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The idea behind the probabilistic causation theories is that, ceteris paribus causes raise the prob-
abilities of their eﬀects. This basic idea is generally formalized using conditional probabilities. Let
(Ω,F,P) be a probability space. For any sets A,B ∈ F with P (B) > 0, the conditional probability
is deﬁned as P (A|B)=P (A ∩ B)/P (B). Here we consider the probability function as a mathe-
matical object satisfying the Kolmororov axioms. It might be interpreted as a personal degree of
belief (often based on previous empirical analysis), or as a propensity law of physical events (Pop-
per, 1983) that can be estimated using frequency limits (as considered by von Mises 1939), but the
speciﬁc interpretation has little relevance for our purposes (for a discussion see, e.g. Dawid, 2004).
The ﬁrst deﬁnition of probabilistic causation, known as “Probability-Raising” (PR), considers
that A causes B, where 0 <P(A) < 1, if and only if
P (B|A) >P(B|Ac) (1)
where Ac denotes the complement of the set A, see Suppes (1970). It is equivalent to P (B|A) >
P (B)1, and also to the property of positive statistical dependence P (A ∩ B) >P(A)P (B).I f
the last inequality is reversed the events show negative statistical dependence, and if an equality
holds the events are statistically independent. Clearly, the PR notion of causality introduces some
ﬂexibility on the deterministic formulations, but it is perfectly symmetric (if A causes B in a PR
sense, then also B causes A in a PR sense). In other words, this formulation is closer to equivalence
rather than causation.
Furthermore, PR is sensitive to spurious causality. If A and B are both caused by some third
factor C ∈ F ,t h e ni tm a yb et h a tP (B|A) >P(B|Ac) even though B does not cause A, since A
and B are positive dependent and simultaneously caused by C. Hans Reichenbach (1956) suggested
the idea of “screening oﬀ” to apply to a particular type of probabilistic relationship. Given three
sets A,B,C ∈ F and P (A ∩ C) > 0, then C is said to screen A oﬀ from B if
P (B|A ∩ C)=P (B|C)
1P (B|A) >P(B|Ac) ⇔ P (B|A)P (Ac) >P(B|Ac)P (Ac) ⇔
P (B|A)(1− P (A)) >P(B|Ac)P (Ac) ⇔ P (B|A) >P(B|A)P (A)+P (B|Ac)P (Ac)=P (B)
4which means that C renders B irrelevant to A in probabilistic terms. (In fact, this is equivalent to
“conditional statistical independence” P (A ∩ B|C)=P (A|C)P (B|C) between A and B). Using
this notion, we can deﬁne the ‘no screening oﬀ’ probabilistic causation, using the probability raise
condition P (B|A) >P(B|Ac) together with the condition that there is no C that screens A oﬀ
from B.
But the ‘no screening oﬀ’ condition is not suﬃcient to solve the spurious causality problem, since it
just eliminates events C that conditionally make A and B statistically independent. But there might
be other events C such that P (A ∩ B|C) >P(A|C)P (B|C) (or the opposite) that cause both A
and B. Due to the “Simpson’s Paradox,” we may have that P (B|A) >P(B|Ac) with probabilistic
inequalities reversals P (B|A ∩ C) <P(B|Ac ∩ C) and P (B|A ∩ Cc) <P(B|Ac ∩ Cc) for some C.
Alternatively, other authors have considered causality conditional to some speciﬁcs i t u a t i o n ,t o
express that A raises the probability of B under some speciﬁce v e n tC ∈ F, called “test situation”,
with P (A ∩ C) > 0 so that P (B|A ∩ C) >P(B|Ac ∩ C). Often, this condition is required for all
the event C in a class of test situations. For a review of this literature, see Cartwright (1979),
Skyrms (1980), Eells (1991, chapters 2, 3, and 4) and Hitchcock (1993). But the deﬁnition of test
situations introduces substantial complexity, and it does not solve the symmetry problem.
All the considered reﬁnements of PR causation are based on (1), and therefore are aﬀected by
symmetry. More complex formulations of causality have been proposed to introduce asymmetries
with little success, see e.g. Reichenbach (1956), Price (1991), Arntzenius (1993), Papineau (1993),
and Hausman (1998). Other authors suggest that the necessary asymmetry is provided by our per-
spective as agents, see e.g. Price (1991). For instance, simple regression analysis is often interpreted
in terms of causality by some researchers, even though correlation is a bi-directional relationship.
A useful argument in logic to establish causal relationships is the “reductio absurdum” equivalence
that states: A ⇒ B if and only if no − B ⇒ no − A. Some authors consider the “counterfactual
causality”, where causality is deﬁned using the idea that A causes B if the probability that A does
not occur is higher with B than it would be if B had not happened, i.e.
P (Ac|B) >P(Ac|Bc)
or equivalently P (A|Bc) <P(A|B), for a review see Lewis (1986), Noordhof (1999), and Kvart
(1997). But probabilistic counterfactual causality is actually equivalent to positive dependence2,
and therefore to PR causality, so that it is still aﬀected by symmetry.
2P (A|Bc) <P(A|B) ⇔ P (A|Bc)P (Bc) <P(A|B)P (Bc) ⇔ P (A|Bc)P (Bc) <P(A|B)(1− P (B)) ⇔
P (A|Bc)P (Bc)+P (A|B)P (B) <P(A|B) ⇔ P (A) <P(A|B) ⇔ P (A ∩ B) >P(A)P (B)
5Alternative notions of probabilistic causality have been considered in the statistical literature,
usually introducing random variables. In this setting, a measurable event A with 0 <P(A) < 1
causes a random vector Y if the conditional probabilities satisfy that
P (Y ∈ B|A) 6= P (Y ∈ B|Ac) (2)
for some measurable set B. Testing non-causality means using data to decide if the null hypothesis
H0 :s u p y |F (y|A) − F (y|Ac)| =0is true, where F (y) is the cumulative probability distribution of
Y. In practice, a weaker property is usually studied, such as the homogeneity of conditional means
H0 : E (Y |A)=E (Y |Ac), i.e.
H0 : E (Y |d =1 )− E (Y |d =0 )=0 , (3)
where d = I (A) and I (A) is the indicator function of the set A. In empirical applications, the
null hypothesis can be tested using ANOVA and MANOVA methods. If additional regressors Z
are included, the null hypothesis H0 : P (E (Y |d =1 ,Z)=E (Y |d =0 ,Z)) = 1 can be tested with
ANACOVA methods under linearity. As a consequence, (static) non-causality is often discussed
using heterogeneity of linear regression models. In experimental settings, the regressors are dummy
variables associated to some treatment, and the regression coeﬃcients are interpreted as potential
eﬀects on the dependent variable. The signiﬁcant heterogeneity of coeﬃcients in the regression
model is interpreted as a proof of causation, moving interpretations from association (correlation or
statistical dependence) to causation. For an introduction to experimental design see Cochran and
Cox (1957). The experimental analysis is the cornerstone of manipulability theories of causation
considered by Gasking (1955), Collingwood (1940), von Wright (1971), and Menzies and Price (1993),
and Sobel (1998). Pearl (1995) considers graphic structures to depict these causal relationships. More
in general, a linear regression relationship between two random vectors X,Y is a model for linear
association Y = ΠX + v. Although the variables Y are often called endogenous, they are chosen
by the researcher who could similarly regress X with respect to Y . Correlation, means dependence,
and statistical dependence are essentially concepts of symmetric association and do not constitute
a valid setting for causal analysis.
Some authors use even more dubious notions of probabilistic causality based on Simultaneous
Equation Models (SEM), also known as structural models. These models were developed by econo-
metricians in the 1940s (driven by the “Cowless Commission for research in Economics” and building
on Haavelmo’s work), to estimate the parameters in economic models whose equilibrium is deter-
mined by a system of equations conditional on exogenous elements. In essence, these models specify
6a covariance structure. Structural models and the related path analysis, are nowadays commonly
used to justify causality claims in social sciences, see e.g. Sobel (1995). SEM postulated relationships
between variables in a vector Y ∈ RG conditionally on certain environmental variables X ∈ RK,
assuming a parametric relationship g (Y,X,θ0)=ε where some assumptions are considered about
the conditional distribution of ε|X, typically E [ε|X]=0and Va r[ε|X]=Σ. For example, the
linear SEM is given by the linear system
BY + CX = ε.
A structural model is well deﬁned only if there is a locally unique relationship that can be regarded
as an inverse of the model Y = f (X,ε,β0) known as the reduced form, and θ0 can be obtained from
β0. In the linear SEM, for example, if rank(B)=G (⇔ det(B) 6=0 )w ec a nw r i t et h em o d e la s
Y = ΠX + v, where Π = −B−1C and v = B−1ε so that Ω = E [vtv0
t]=B−1ΣB−10.T h i sm o d e li s
known as the reduced form associated with the structural form.
Typically the square matrix B is normalized to have ones in the main diagonal, and the other
coeﬃcients in BY +CX = ε are often (wrongly) interpreted in terms of static causality. For example,
if B is a triangular matrix some authors interpret the relationship as a chain of successive eﬀects.
A path analysis ﬁgure is often drawn depicting the linear SEM structure. This ﬁgure displays the
variables Y,X and a ﬂow diagram of causal eﬀects in the form of arrows connecting variables related
by non-null coeﬃcients in B, C. I denote Bi,j the coeﬃcient (i,j) in the matrix B and similarly for
Ci,k in C,t h e ni fBi,j 6=0and Bj,i 6=0a double headed arrow connect Yi and Yj, replaced by a
single headed arrow if one of these coeﬃcients is zero, and if Ci,k 6=0a single headed arrow follows
from Xk to Yi. The use of graphical models for drawing causal relationships, based on ideas of Sewal
Wright back in the 1920s, is extensive in social sciences after the work of Dudley Duncan (1966),
see Whittaker (1990).
Structural models are not identiﬁed. Given any multiequation regression model, Y = ΠX + v,
with E [Xv]=0and E [vv0]=Ω, if we multiply the model by an arbitrary non-singular matrix B
we obtain BY + CX = ε with Σ = BΩB0 and Π = −B−1C. Since there are inﬁnitely many regular
matrices B, we can obtain inﬁnitely many structural forms associated to a multiequation regression
model. From another perspective, if we take an arbitrary factorization Ω = ΨΣΨ0 where Ψ has
complete rank and Σ is symmetric and positive deﬁnite (e.g. we can use a Choleski decomposition,
obtaining a lower triangular structural form — a procedure popularized by Chirstopher A. Sims,
and/or combine it with a permutation matrix to reorder the path arrows), then multiplying the
7reduced form by B = Ψ−1 we can deﬁne a structural form whose perturbations have covariance
matrix Σ . Therefore, the concept of structural form has little meaning from a statistical point of
view.
To solve the ambiguity of structural models, it is necessary to assume some identiﬁcation con-
straints W (B,C, Σ)=0 , which are an arbitrary choice of the researcher based on his theoretical
dogma. The SEM is identiﬁed if the system W (B,C, Σ)=0 , BΠ + C =0 , Ω = B−1ΣB−10
has a unique solution {B,C,Σ}. The output is somewhat arbitrary. For instance, we can identify
the structural form {B,C,Σ} by requiring that Bi,j =0 , or a reciprocal eﬀect Bj,i =0 ,o re v e n
Bi,j = −Bj,i meaning that both variables are aﬀected by identical opposite structural relationships.
Any choice has nothing to do with the causal laws in nature. Several authors (e.g., Cliﬀ 1983,
Holland 1988) have criticized the use of structural models to infer causation. Simultaneous equation
models are artiﬁcial structures identiﬁed from the reduced form regression. Yet, we observe too of-
ten that research articles using regression models are rejected in social sciences because endogeneity
was not taken into account. Structural forms can be a convenient method for adjusting theoretical
models (with static-interactions) to empirical data, provided that the model is rich enough to ensure
the identiﬁcation of the parameters (setting additional constraints). But we cannot test if the model
“is correct”, nor can we interpret the coeﬃcients in B, C (nor the coeﬃcient signs) in terms of
“causality”. The ambiguities are even bigger with nonlinear structural models, where identiﬁcation
is often a local concept.
As if the subjectivity of SEMs was not important enough, some researchers (considering high
dimensional vectors X,Y ) combine ideas from structural models and factor analysis, see e.g. Jöreskog
(1973, 1978) and Bollen (1989). In particular, factor structural models, consider that Bη+Cξ = ε,
where η and ξ are unobserved latent variables called “constructs”, which are given by the factor
model Y = ΛY η + ε, X = ΛX ξ + δ. Factor structural models are extremely ambiguous, usually
identiﬁed by setting some rotation for the latent factors along with the structural identiﬁcation
assumptions. The resulting output is so ambiguous for the practitioner, that any result can be
obtained, provided that we devote enough time to estimate under diﬀerent identiﬁcation schemes.
Yet, causal relationships conclusions drawn from these models pervade some social sciences, enhanced
by computer-friendly software such as LISREL, EQS or AMOS.
Some authors have proposed probabilistic theories of causation based on the idea that causes
usually precede their eﬀects in time, and the notion of dynamic causality can be applied only to
cause-eﬀect relationships that take place along some time horizon. But this idea in unrelated with
8the causality concept in formal logic. Suppes (1970, chapter 2) and Eells (1991, chapter 5) deﬁne
causal asymmetry in terms of temporal asymmetry, using time as a kind of test situation. Dynamic
causality has been also approached by models based on automated procedures, see Spirtes, Glymour
and Scheinnes (2000), Scheines (1997), Hausmand and Woodward (1999), and also Pearl (2000).
In the statistical literature, the simplest notion of dynamic causality can be considered in time
series models where past is considered cause for the present. Assume that the stochastic process
{Yt}t∈Z has a spectral density satisfying
R
Πd logf (λ)dλ > −∞,
R
Πd f (λ)
−1 dλ < ∞. There are
inﬁnitely many factorizations of the spectral density,
f (λ)=( 2 π)
−1 σ2 |A(λ)|
−1
where A(λ) is normalized with a0 =
R
Πd A(λ)dλ =1 . We usually identify a particular factor by
setting some coeﬃcients to zero. In particular, A(λ) is known as causal representation when it has
Fourier expansion with real coeﬃcients ak =
R
Πd A(λ)eik0λdλ =0for k>0, and anticausal if ak =0
for k<0. Each of these factorizations leads to linear autoregressive models expressed with respect
to the past or the future of {Yt} respectively, as suggested by Wold (1954) and Wiener (1956). This
notion of past autoregressive modelling must be interpreted in terms of predictability rather than
causality. It is just an arbitrary interpretation of symmetric autocorrelations from one side, as a tool
to identify time series models. Actually, it is not clear that past is a cause for future, particularly
when we consider certain abstract phenomena in astrophysics and Quantum physics, where we can
ﬁnd paradoxes easily. For example it is commonly accepted that the Big-Bang is the cause for the
universe dynamic expansion, but according to the current physical theories, time did not exist when
the Big-Bang occurred (the time-dimension was caused by it), so we cannot consider the Big-Bang
a “dynamic cause” of the universe expansion because it is a vicious circular deﬁnition.
The econometric literature has considered more complex notions of dynamic causality. Using ideas
of stochastic processes, assume that a sequence of measurements {Xt} of the “causal” phenomenon
are regularly taken along the time horizon, and measures {Yt} of the “eﬀect” phenomenon are
similarly taken. Then, causality can be interpreted using recursive arguments: we say that there is
dynamic causality if for all time periods, (1) the measurements of the “eﬀect” Yt are statistically
dependent on lagged measures of the causal variable Xt−1,X t−2 conditionally on its own lags, and
(2) there is no reverse symmetric relationship (i.e., measurements of the “cause” Xt are statistically
independent from lags of the eﬀect variable Yt−1,Y t−2,.. conditionally on its own lags). This idea
was put across by Granger (1969), who built on earlier work in statistics literature (Wold, 1954
9and Wiener 1956), and it is nowadays known as “Granger’s causality”, for a review see Engle et
al. (1983) and Geweke (1984). Granger’s causality is essentially a notion of crossed predictability
between two time series, and it is also close to vicious circularity: in order to assess whether Xt
causes Yt, we would already need to know whether Yt causes Xt.G r a n g e r ’s causality has considerable
operational signiﬁcance in empirical analysis. Unfortunately, a deﬁnition of causality based on
dynamic regularities is likely to consider spurious regularities when both {Xt,Y t} are caused by Zt,
but Xt shows the inﬂuence of Zt before Yt.
The problem of providing a valid probabilistic causation theory is still open, and there is no
general deﬁnition avoiding symmetries and time conditional requirements yet. Many authors are
uncomfortable when thinking about the notion of causality in an uncertainty context. In part, as
Geweke (1984) points out, because “the idea is notoriously diﬃcult to formalize, as casual reading in
the philosophy of science will attest”. Statisticians have essentially abandoned the quest for a valid
concept of probabilistic causation. In the next section, a probabilistic causality notion is presented
that avoids all the symmetries and conﬂicts inherent in previous deﬁnitions.
VALID PROBABILISTIC CAUSATION
Let Ω be the universal set, and F a σ-algebra of events that can be asserted as true or false with
some probability. Using set theory, for any sets A,B ⊂ Ω we can also express the fact A ⇒ B
through the expression A ⊂ B, meaning that if any ω ∈ A occurs then also ω ∈ B is satisﬁed.
Since we can also express the fact A ⇒ B through the expression A ⊂ B, then it is clear that
P (A) ≤ P (B), but the reciprocal is not true and that is the reason for failure in PR deﬁnitions of
probabilistic causality. By contrast, I will introduce a concept A ⇒ B almost sure, using the idea
that A ⊂ B almost sure with respect to a probability function P, i.e. the probability of ω ∈ A
which are not in B have zero probability. Clearly, A ⊂ B if and only if A ∩ B = A, a n di fa n do n l y
if A ∩ Bc = ∅ where Bc = {ω ∈ Ω : ω/ ∈ B} denotes the complement of set B. Therefore a valid
deﬁnition of almost sure causation is that:
Deﬁnition almost sure causality. Given a probability space (Ω,F,P), for any sets A,B ∈ F
we say that A causes B almost surely if A ∩ Bc has null probability, i.e.
P (A ∩ Bc)=0 .
I denote almost sure causality by A
a.s.[P]
⇒ B. If A,B ⊂ Ω are not measurables, the deﬁnition
can be extended using P∗ (A ∩ Bc)=0 , where P∗ denotes the outer probability.
10I am not requiring A to be a minimal cause for B, and it could have some irrelevant components.
Is a yt h a tA is minimal cause if A ∩ Bc = ∅, meaning that there is not any non empty subset in A
that does not belong to B (note that I simply require this set to have a zero probability measure).
This concept is compatible with the intuition underlying propositional implications.
The proposed deﬁnition is an asymmetric deﬁnition. If P (A ∩ Bc)=0and P (Ac ∩ B)=0 ,
then A ∪ B = A ∩ B except for a set of probability null, meaning that both concepts A and B
are essentially the same P ({A ∪ B}\{A ∩ B})=0(i.e. both are equal to the intersection A ∩ B,
and all other components are negligible in probability terms). It means that both events are almost
surely equivalent, P (A = B)=1 .
Clearly, for any measurable set A, it is satisﬁed that A
a.s.[P]
⇒ Ω. We can consider the “reductio
absurdum” equivalence (A ⇒ B if and only if Bc ⇒ Ac). T h es a m ep r o p e r t yi ss a t i s ﬁed in almost
sure causality, where A
a.s.[P]
⇒ B if and only if Bc a.s.[P]
⇒ Ac since P (Bc ∩ (Ac)
c)=0 . This is a form
of “conterfactual analysis”.
Note that A = ∅ implies any set B ∈ F,s i n c eP (A ∩ Bc)=P (∅)=0 ;although in general
we will consider non empty sets A with P (A) > 0. If B = Ω, then for any set A ∈ F,s i n c e
P (A ∩ Bc)=P (∅)=0 , but in general we will consider sets B Ã Ω and with P (B) < 1. If A and
Bc are statistically independent, then P (A ∩ Bc)=P (A)P (Bc) and causality means that A has
zero probability or B has probability one, so that the relationship is meaningless.
The next table shows all the causal events that can be established between A and B,
A Ac
B A ∩ B Ac ∩ B
Bc A ∩ Bc Ac ∩ Bc



















Let I (A)=I (A)(ω) denote the indicator function for the set A ∈ F (i.e., I (A)=1if ω ∈ A and
I (A)=0otherwise). Then, we can express P (A ∩ Bc)=E [I (A ∩ Bc)], where any of the following
11expressions can be considered:
I (A ∩ Bc)=I (A) · I (Bc)=I (A) · (1 − I (B)) = I (A) − I (A ∩ B),
I (A ∩ Bc)=m i n {I (A),I(Bc)} =m i n{I (A),1 − I (B)},
I (A ∩ Bc)=m a x {0,(I (A) − I (B))} := (I (A) − I (B))
+ ,
a l lo fw h i c hc a nb ep r o v e dc o n s i d e r i n gc o m b i n a t ions of indicator values giving a value of 1. To
assess almost sure causality in empirical context, we can replace the expectations E [I (A ∩ Bc)] by
averages of observed events ω.
A smaller σ-algebra A ⊂ F can cause almost surely the event B ∈ F,i fE [Z · I (Bc)] = 0 for
any bounded A-measurable random variable Z (actually, it is enough to check it for all Z indicator
functions of events in A). Then we say A
a.s.[P]
⇒ B.
Often, causal relationships are based on random variables. The introduction of random variables
is useful because then we can relate probabilistic causality and empirical inferences. Most of the
Physical laws, can be expressed in terms of systems of equations B = {f (X)=ε}, or inequality
systems such as B = {f (X) ≤ 0}.
Equations and Causality: Let us consider a measure space (Ξ,B), and X a measurable measur-
able application X : Ω → Ξ, then (Ω,F,P) induces a probability law PX = P◦X−1 on (Ξ,B). In par-
ticular, if we consider the Borel euclidean space
¡
Rd,Bd¢
then a measurable application X : Ω → Rd
is a random vector. Given two events α,β ∈ B and setting
A = {ω ∈ Ω : X (ω) ∈ α},B = {ω ∈ Ω : X (ω) ∈ β}
then A
a.s.[P]
⇒ B (i.e. E [I (X ∈ α) · (1 − I (X ∈ β))] = 0) is trivially equivalent to α
a.s.[PX]
⇒ β.
This approach is particularly relevant for empirical purposes. In particular, considering the Borel
euclidean space, we can consider theories expressed by systems of equations such as A = {g(X)=0 }
and B = {g(X)=0 }; or alternatively by inequalities A = {g(X) ≤ 0}, and B = {f (X) ≤ 0}.
A variety of cases can be studied here, for example the experimental design framework. As-
sume that the event A denotes a speciﬁc treatment that can be set by the researcher. Then, we
can consider if B is satisﬁed when the treatment A is applied, and study the causal hypothesis
E [I (A ∩ Bc) ]=0 . In particular, we can consider an event deﬁned by a conditional expectation such
as B = {E [Y |Z]=0 }, and the null causal hypothesis is
E [I (A) − I (A ∩ {E [Y |Z]=0 })] = 0.
12Note that the classical experimental design framework considers if E [Y |Z,A]=E [Y |Z,Ac] a.s.,
which is a relevant but diﬀerent problem.
In most empirical applications, we assume that the probability function of X is unknown but we
observe a sample of data identically distributed as the random vector X. Alternatively, some random
variables could be observed but others could be regarded as latent variables or random shocks (about
which probability distribution we have some information). For instance, consider events given by
A = {ω ∈ Ω : g(X) ≥ ε},B = {ω ∈ Ω : f (X) ≥  }, (4)
where (ε, ) are unobserved random variables, and deﬁne H (ε, |x) as the conditional cumulative
probability distribution of (ε, )|X = x. Applying the law of iterated expectations, the causality
statement A
a.s.[P]
⇒ B can be expressed by the identity,
E [E [I (ε ≤ g (X))|X] − E [I (ε ≤ g (X))I (  ≤ f (X))|X] ]=0 ⇔
E [H (g(X)|X) − H (g(X),f(X)|X) ]=0 .
were H (ε|x) = lim →∞ H (ε, |x) is the marginal conditional distribution of ε|X = x. The distribu-
tion H can be speciﬁed by a parametric model or be unknown (e.g., in a semiparametric setup).
The notion of probabilistic causality can be extended to the dynamic framework. Let us consider
Ξ a topological space deﬁned by the Cartesian product of a non empty family of complete separable
metric spaces {Ξt}t∈T each one with a Borel σ-algebra Bt.L e tB denote the cylindrical σ-algebra
generated by the projections (containing the Cartesian product of all the Borel σ-algebras Bt), which
is equal to the Borel σ-algebra for the product topology due to the separability assumption. Let
X be measurable applications from (Ω,F) into (Ξ,B), i.e. a stochastic processes. Then we can
consider
A = {ω ∈ Ω : X (ω) ∈ α},B = {ω ∈ Ω : X (ω) ∈ β}
for α, β ∈ B. In particular, we can consider events α and β about the ocurrence of some projections
A = {Xt = a0,X t−1 = a1,...,Xt−L = aL} and B = {Xt+1 = b1}, or more complex events such as
A = {g (Xt,X t−1,...,Xt−L)=0 } and B = {f (Xt+1,X t+2,...,Xt+K)=0 }. A variety of dynamic
probabilistic causal relationships can be considered, including random shocks {εt} in the expressions
g and f.
Finally, notice that causality can be considered as a limit case in the probability space (Ω,F,P).
This is useful in contexts where causality is diﬃcult to assess but can be studied by a series of related
situations.
13Deﬁnition Asymptotic probabilistic causality. Given a probability space (Ω,F,P), consider
a sequence of events {An} ⊂ F, and {Bn} ∈ F.Is a yt h a t{An} cause asymptotically {Bn} in
probability if limn→∞ P (An ∩ Bc
n)=0 , and {An} cause asymptotically {Bn} almost surely if
P (limsupn→∞ {An ∩ Bc
n})=0 .
The use of limit ideas allows us to consider asymptotic forms of dynamic causality, such as A =
{g(Xt,X t−1,X t−2....)=0 } and B = {f (Xt+1,X t+2,...)=0 }, involving an inﬁnite number of lags.
Although conceptually correct, the proposed notion of almost sure causality is too strong. Usually,
scientists can relay on the strength of a causal relationship that only fails in quite rare events. In this
sense, for the notion of causality it would be suﬃcient that the event A∩Bc has a small probability,
even if it is not equal to zero.
Deﬁnition  −probabilistic causality. Given a probability space (Ω,F,P), for any sets A,B ∈ F
and any   ∈ (0,1),Is a yt h a tA causes B in terms of  −probabilistic causality if Pr(A ∩ Bc) ≤  .
Asymptotic causality can be also deﬁned on these terms requiring that limn→∞ P (An ∩ Bc
n) ≤
  (in probability) or P (limsupn→∞ {An ∩ Bc
n}) ≤   (almost surely), respectively.
Since we can consider several values   ∈ [0,1],Id e ﬁne the causality ε-tolerance as
ε =i n f{  ∈ [0,1] : P (A ∩ Bc) ≤  } = P (A ∩ Bc).
If it is equal to zero, there is almost sure causality.
Physical laws can be described at diﬀerent coarser levels of detail, and there might be causal
relationships that are valid relatively to a speciﬁc level, but not in general. In Appendix A, I discuss
the concept of conditional probabilistic causation.
Sequential causality
The probabilistic causality notion has been deﬁned as a stable fact: if we think that A implies B
almost surely, this notion is not subject to any change. However, what is believed true or false can
change with time (e.g., due to Bayesian learning, or other exogenous changes). We introduce sequen-
tial causation to study causality for cases where the basic beliefs evolve, often due to information
arrival.
In this section I will consider a form of sequential causality. Thus, I consider a sequence of
probability spaces {(Ω,Fn,P n)}, where the {Fn} is a ﬁltration (i.e., a non decreasing sequence of
14σ-algebras Fn ⊂ Fm if n<m ), and deﬁne F as the smallest σ-algebra containing the union of all
the Fn. A particular case is the non-learning situation, where Fn = F for all n and all the Pn are
deﬁn e do nt h es a m eF.W ec a nd e ﬁne a type of probabilistic causation in the following sense.
Deﬁnition Sequential Causality in Probability. Given a sequence of probability spaces (Ω,Fn,P n).
If A,B ⊂ F Is a yA causes B sequentially if limn→∞ Pn (A ∩ Bc)=0 . Furthermore, for any
sequence {An} with An ∈ Fn for all n, and any B ∈ F, I say that that {An} causes B
sequentially with respect to {Pn} if,
lim
n→∞Pn (An ∩ Bc)=0 .
Similarly, if An,B n ∈ Fn for each n, I can say that that {An} causes {Bn} sequentially with
respect to {Pn} if, limn→∞ Pn (An ∩ Bc
n)=0 .
Sequential causality can be related with convergence of probability measures. Clearly, if Pn → P
in the sense that limn→∞ Pn (A)=P (A) for all set A ∈ F, then A causes B sequentially respect
to {Pn} where A,B ∈ F,i m p l i e st h a tA
a.s.[P]
⇒ B. If Ω is a topological space, and {Fn} is included
in the Borel σ-algebra, the idea can be extended to weak convergence. Assume that Pn →w. P (i.e.
limn→∞ Pn (A)=P (A) for all A in the Borel σ-algebra with P (∂A)=0where ∂A is the frontier
of A), if A causes B sequentially with respect to {Pn} and P (∂ (A ∩ Bc)) = 0, then A
a.s.[P]
⇒ B.I n
some cases we can also consider sequences of causal events: if Pn converges to P in the variational
norm (i.e. supA∈F |Pn (A) − P (A)| =0 )t h e nlimn→∞ Pn (An ∩ Bc
n)=0implies that {An} cause
asymptotically {Bn} in probability P (i.e. limn→∞ P (An ∩ Bc
n)=0 ). In Appendix B, I discuss the
robustness of probabilistic and sequential causation.
The events An,B n can be deﬁned in terms of random variables. We deﬁne a sequence of random








let us consider the events An = {Xn ∈ α} and B = {X ∈ β}, where α,β ∈ Bd, then we can
consider the asymptotic causality by the requirement limn→∞ EPn [I (Xn ∈ α)(1− I (X ∈ β))] = 0.
These expectations can be estimated empirically, and related to empirical stochastic processes for
triangular arrays. The rest of the paper is focused on the empirical study of probabilistic causation.
15EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND CAUSALITY
Karl Popper (1959) classiﬁes theories as either metaphysical or physical, where the physical ones
make predictions about the real world and can be empirically tested, in contrast to the metaphysical
theories. For example, this paper discusses metaphysical concepts about causality. But not every
physical theory is scientiﬁc. Popper used the notion of falsiﬁability to “demarcate” what science
is: a physical theory is falsiﬁable (refutable or testable) if it can be shown false by real experience
(from direct observation or a controlled physical experiment). For example, theological dogmas are
unfalsiﬁable. According to Popper, if the physical theory fails it must be discarded or reshaped, but
passing empirical tests does not ensure that the falsiﬁable theory is true. In this section I formalize
these concepts, and study probabilistic causality from an empirical point of view.
Here I formalize some of these notions. Therefore, I will consider a universe of contingent ele-
mentary events Ω,i nt h i ss e tId e ﬁne a σ-algebra F of subsets or events that we are interested in
studying. We say that the universe Ω is physical if there exists a set of X applications X : Ω → R
of (observable) empirical signals about the universe, and name (Ω,X) a physical space. Then, I say
that F is a testable σ-algebra (or falsiﬁable) if F ⊂ σ(X),w h e r eσ(X) is the smallest σ-algebra such
that the applications in X a r em e a s u r a b l e( i . e .σ(X)=
©
X−1 (U):B ∈ B,X∈ X
ª
with B the Borel
real σ-algebra). For us, scientiﬁc knowledge is demarcated by physical and testable measure spaces
(Ω,F). Then, we can consider (probabilistic) scientiﬁc knowledge from two sources: deduction and
induction.
1. Probabilistic Deduction: Given a measurable space (Ω,F) (physical and testable in sci-
ences), let us consider some measurable assumptions {Bj}j∈J that we call “premises” with
known probabilities {P (Bj)}. Deduction means the computation of probabilities for other
events that can be expressed in terms of the premises by using countable intersections, unions
or conjugations and the probability axioms.
For a rich enough class of premises, P (A) can be deduced for any A ∈ F,w h i l s ti fn o t ,w ec a n




, and the events excluded from this σ-algebra
will be called “conjectures”. In deduction we take the probabilities {P (Bj)} as known, but in the
scientiﬁc method this knowledge comes from induction.
2. Probabilistic Induction: Given a physical and testable measurable space (Ω,F),w ep e r -
form statistical inference to assign probabilities P (•) to some measurable events A ∈ F from
16empirical data. In some cases, the inductive inference estimates P (•) for a few simple events
from which the probability of A can be deduced, but often we can directly estimate P (A).
More often, we try to estimate the whole distribution P.
Deduction and induction can be combined. Given a testable physical space (Ω,X), the process





F ⊂ σ(X) is called “abduction.” Then, induction can be used to allocate probabilities to the
premises, and then to deduce the probability of more complex events in F. This is central to the
scientiﬁc method. Note also that the physical space (Ω,X) can change with new information. We
can consider a monotonously increasing sequence {Xn} of sets of signals about Ω, and deﬁne a ﬁl-
tration {Fn} with Fn ⊂ σ(Xn) of reﬁned testable theories. We can explain the progress of scientiﬁc
knowledge as the permanent process of getting information Xn, and updating the probability infer-
ences of contingent assertions by conditioning on the σ-algebra Fn reﬁned by the new information
Xn. Popper’s discussion about falsiﬁed/unfalsiﬁed theories can be reconsidered under the light of
the presented framework.
Regarding the estimation of P in the induction process, classical inference methods usually quan-
tify the probability measure P (•), considering a parametric model or family {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ}, and
setting a single value θ0 ∈ Θ in a separable metric space3 that minimizes some adjusting func-
tion or speciﬁcd i s t a n c eD(P,Pθ) between the model and the true probability. Then, the induction
process estimates θ0 by minimizing the adjustment D(P,P θ) of Pθ to the empirical distribution P (or
smoothed version of it) of the collected data. These procedures are compatible with the frequentist
view about probability laws, providing sound ground for scientiﬁc analysis.
Members of the “Bayesian statistics” school, however, think that the probability or degree of
belief P (•) cannot be “quantiﬁed” precisely. Instead, they postulate a set of possible probability
laws usually parametrized by some model {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ}, quantifying the probability of each law with
an arbitrary prior belief distribution π(θ), and updating their prior assumption with new data,
computing π(θ|data) with the Bayes theorem4. Therefore, Bayesian statistics computes a “diﬀuse”
or imprecise quantiﬁcation Pθ of the degree of belief for falsiﬁable events. The posterior distribution
is dependent upon the initial prior π assumption, although its inﬂuence is reduced when the dataset
3In classical inference Θ is included in an euclidean space. But it could alternatively be included in an inﬁnito-
dimensional space (as in the nonparametric and semiparametric literature, for example)
4It is not clear why Bayesians think that it is possible to quantify the prior. One could similarly parametrize a
family of “priors” {πγ (θ):γ ∈ Γ} and postulate a higher order prior probability µ(γ) for these parameters, and so
on, developing a hierarchically complex Bayesian structure.
17increases. The approach is somewhat useless and therefore, paradoxically, Bayesians are forced to
use Pθe as a quantiﬁcation of the probability P (•) where θ
e = E [θ|data]. Then, classical and
Bayesian methods show striking analogies in a few models. The Bayesian approach is not accepted
by many scientists because it introduces more subjectivity in the induction process than the classical
approach, and will be avoided in this paper.
The analysis of probabilistic causal relationships can be tackled from basic premises using deduc-
tion, or it can be studied directly from empirical data using induction. This is the aim of the second
part of this paper. If we use empirical data, the analysis can lead to the rejection/acceptance of a
probabilistic causal relationship through hypothesis testing. The empirical tests are performed with
as i g n i ﬁcance level (quantifying the probability of rejecting a valid theory) and power (quantifying
the probability of rejecting a false theory). From the empirical point of view, the study of reciprocal
causality is a similar problem, and I will focus on one-directional analysis.
To study an almost sure causal relationship A
a.s.[P]
⇒ B, I consider the Bernoulli random variable
δ = I (ω ∈ A ∩ Bc) with π = P (δ =1 )=P (A ∩ Bc). The simplest empirical tests of causation
must study the relative frequency from a sample of independent observations {δ1,...,δn}.I fId e ﬁne
Dn =
Pn
i=1 δi then b πn = Dn/n is the relative frequency. A simple decision test is the classical
technique of counter-example: if b πn > 0 (i.e. Dn > 0) then we reject the a.s. causality. The
signiﬁcance level of this test is 100% since Pr(Dn > 0) = 0 under the null π =0 ,a n dt h et e s ti s
consistent as the power is given by
Pr(Dn > 0) = 1 − Pr(Dn =0 )=1− (1 − π)
n → 1,
for any alternative π ∈ (0,1]. Therefore, a causal relationship is rejected if it has at least one
counterexample, and the power of this reasoning increases with n.
In empirical analysis, even if the causal relationship A
a.s.[P]
⇒ B is true, experiments are often
aﬀected by noisy elements corrupting the probability π, so that for a large enough sample we can
easily observe a relative frequency b πn small but positive. In other words, if we apply the counter-
example rule, in many cases we would end up rejecting causality. The counter-example rule is too
strict for studying causality in real world situations where the value P (A ∩ Bc) can be small but not
too clear based on empirical data. Two strategies can be considered to introduce more ﬂexibility:
The ﬁrst approach is based on sequential causality concepts. Let us consider a sequence {(Ω,Fn,P n)}
∞
n=1 ,
and {An} causes B sequentially for {Pn}, (in particular we can consider An = A for all n). We
18deﬁne πn = Pn (An ∩ Bc) ∈ (0,1), and consider that asymptotically
πn = c + λ/n + o
¡
n−1¢
for a small value λ>0 and some c ≥ 0. The null assumption of sequential causality can be stated by
H0 : c =0so that nπn → λ, whilst the alternative assumption is H1 : c>0 and nπn →∞ . Deﬁne
a Bernoulli variable δn = I (ω ∈ An ∩ Bc) with Pn (δn =1 )=πn, and consider a triangular array of
i.i.d observations {δn1,...,δnn} distributed as δn for each n. Then I deﬁne Dn =
Pn
i=1 δni. By the De
Moivre-Laplace theorem, under the null Dn −→ w.[Pn] Poiss(λ) where Poiss(λ) denotes a Poisson
random variable with parameter λ. Therefore, if we reject the null for Dn > 0, the probability of
rejection under the null is approximately
Pr(Dn > 0) = 1 − Pr(Dn =0 )→ 1 − e−λ.
close to zero if λ is very small (e−λ → 1 when λ ↓ 0). Actually, we can control the signiﬁcance level in
the testing process, rejecting the null if Dn >z α, where zα is chosen so that Pr(Poiss(λ) >z α)=α
under the null assumption. The value λ>0 determines our robustness requirements. Under the
alternative πn → c>0 and Dn
p
→∞so that Pr(Dn >z α) → 1, i.e. the test is consistent.
We can consider a second procedure for situations where the causal relationship is only approx-
imately satisﬁed, using the notion of  −probabilistic causality. For instance, if δ = I (ω ∈ A ∩ Bc)
with π = P (δ =1 )=P (A ∩ Bc) > 0, using an i.i.d. sample {δ1,...,δn} and b πn = n−1 Pn
i=1 δi then
we can test if π< for some speciﬁc   ∈ (0,1), e.g. using a normal asymptotic distribution if n
is large. Also, we can consider b πn = n−1 Pn
i=1 δi, as an estimate of the causality-tolerance ε.T h i s
second approach will be considered in the causal modelling section.
MODELLING AND CAUSALITY
So far I have discussed the empirical analysis of causality between fully speciﬁed theories A and B.
But usually, scientiﬁc theories are not totally speciﬁc. They are deﬁned by a general model, including
parameters or ﬂexible components to play with in order to empirically strengthen the postulated
causal relationships. Researchers usually choose the parameters that are more likely to have a causal
relationship from a pre-speciﬁed class, relating causality to modelling problems. Following this idea
we can consider, for example, the events Aθ = {gθ (X) ≥ 0} and Bθ = {fθ (X) ≥ 0} (equalities could
be alternatively considered ) with θ ∈ Θ ⊂ RK and modelers can seek the parameter θ0 ∈ Θ for
which a causal relationship Aθ0 ⇒ Bθ0 is most likely; i.e. we minimize the ε-tolerance in θ ∈ Θ.
19Therefore, we are faced with the problem of solving
min
θ∈Θ





where lθ (X)=I (X ∈ Aθ)(1− I (X ∈ Bθ)). These problems are central to a variety of physi-
cal sciences. Given a sample {X1,...,Xn} from P, and appropriate identiﬁcation assumptions, θ0
can be estimated by b θn minimizing the empirical analogous minθ∈Θ Pn (Aθ ∩ Bc
θ), where Pn (A)=
n−1 Pn
i=1 I (Xi ∈ A) denotes the empirical distribution function, i.e.




Notice that causal modelling can be considered in terms of minimization of
R
lθdP for a class of
functions lθ in a variety of cases.
1. First, in some contexts, it might be convenient to replace I (X ∈ Aθ ∩ Bc
θ) by a smooth ap-
proximation to the indicator function. For example, if Aθ,B θ a r ec l o s e ds e t si nas e p a r a b l e
metric space (Ξ,d) such as the euclidean space, then an indicator function I (A)(x) can be
approximated by the uniformly continuous function,
fh (x,A)=( 1− d(x,A)/h)
+ (5)
where h>0, and it is satisﬁed that I (A)(x) ≤ fh (x) ≤ I
¡
Ah¢
(x), where Ah = {x : d(x,A) <h }.
Therefore, we can consider the class of smooth functions
L = {fh (x,Aθ ∩ Bc
θ):θ ∈ Θ}
or alternatively consider an approximation to each set Aθ and Bθ,
L = {lθ (x)=fh (x,Aθ)(1− fh (x,Bθ)) : θ ∈ Θ}.
2. We can also consider a convolution smoothing, considering the sets Aθ ∩ Bc
θ as elements of






I (z ∈ Aθ ∩ Bc
θ)φh (z − x)dz : θ ∈ Θ
¾
(6)




density (other kernels can be considered, alterna-
tively), so that
Z














φh (z − Xi)
!
dz,
20meaning that we integrate Aθ ∩ Bc
θ with respect to a smooth density estimator. To improve
the approximation behaviour we can alternatively consider a class of functions
L =
©
lθ,h1,h2 (x)=fh1 ∗ φh2 : θ ∈ Θ
ª
where lθ,h1,h2 is deﬁned as the convolution of fh1 (x,Aθ ∩ Bc
θ) with a Gaussian kernel φh2.
3. For example, if we consider Aθ = {gθ (X) ≥ ε} and Bθ = {fθ (X) ≥  } where (ε, ) are un-





where lθ (X)=H (gθ (Xi),∞)−H (gθ (Xi),f θ (Xi)), and can be estimated using the estimator
b θn =a r gm i n θ∈Θ
R
lθ dPn.
All the previous examples show that causal modelling consists of minimizing the expectation E [l]
for a class of parametrized functions L.L e t(Ω,F) be a testable physical measurable space, X an
observable random vector with unknown probability P, and {X1,...,Xn} a random sample from P.
Assume that the class {(Aθ ∩ Bc
θ)} can be identiﬁed with a class LΘ = {lθ : θ ∈ Θ} in such way that
minθ∈ΘP (Aθ ∩ Bc
θ)=m i n θ∈Θ
R
lθ dP. To simplify the notation, I will use the notation Pl=
R
ld P ,
and Pn l =
R
ld Pn. We assume that for a class of measurable functions L the causal modelling




and l∗ is estimated with the empirical analogous
b ln ∈ argmin
l∈L
Pn l
We deﬁne the “sub-causality” associated to l ∈ L as
CP (l)=Pl − min
l∈L
Pl= Pl − Pl ∗.





to zero almost surely when the sample size n →∞ .
We focus on the  −probabilistic causality, which is the relevant case for empirical applications.
Assume henceforth that Pl∗ > 0. Notice that if the model allows to establish almost-sure causality













> 0 for ﬁnite samples.
21Consistency




to zero when n →∞ , meaning that P b ln is
a good estimate for Pl∗. Central to the analysis is the study of the supremum norm of the empirical
process {(Pn − P) l}l∈L.





= P b ln − Pn b ln + Pnb ln − Pl∗ ≤ P b ln − Pn b ln +( Pn − P)l∗












|(Pn − P)( l − l0)| ≤ 2sup
l∈L
|(Pn − P) l|,




is obtained, which is determined by the supremum norm of the empirical
process {(Pn − P) l}l∈L . Furthermore, since Pn b ln − P b ln ≤ supl∈L |(Pn − P) l|, bounding the
supremum of the empirical process we get an estimate of the error made when Pn b ln is used to
estimate P b ln.I fId e ﬁne the “empirical sub-causality”,
CPn (l)=Pn l − min
l∈L





then using that Pl∗ ≤ Pb ln, I conclude that




− P (l − l∗)=( Pn − P) l +
³
Pl∗ − Pnb ln
´





and therefore |CPn (l) − CP (l)| is also uniformly bounded by 2sup l∈L |(Pn − P) l|.
The rest of the section is devoted the analysis of conditions ensuring that the supremum norm
of the empirical process {(Pn − P) l}l∈L tends to zero, and its relation with the causal analysis.
Let (L,ρ) be a semimetric space of functions l : Rd → R, and N (ε,L,ρ) the covering number or
minimum number of balls or radius ε needed to cover L,a n dlogN (ε,L,ρ) is known as the metric
entropy. An envelope for the class L is any function L(x) ≥ 0 such that |l(x)| ≤ L(x) for all x ∈ Rd
and all l ∈ L.S i n c ePn puts all its mass on the set of observations {X1,...,Xn}, it is suﬃcient to
our purposes to measure distances at this set. In this paper I consider the semi-metric space (L,ρ n),
for the stochastic distance
ρn (l,l0)=kl − l0kL1(Pn) = n−1
n X
i=1
|l(Xi) − l0 (Xi)|.
22We could consider the Lp (Pn) semi-noms. The covering numbers are useful tools for the analysis of





|(Pn − P) l| >δ
¾
≤ 8E [N (δ/8,L,ρ n)]e−nδ2/128M2
,
which generalizes a popular bound by Vapnik and Chervonenkis (1971) and implies the ULLN when
E [logN (δ,L,ρ n)] = o(n) for all ε>0 (actually, the condition is also necessary for the ULLN).
In the case of non measurable events, we should replace E [·] and P {·} by outer expectations and
probabilities, respectively. We will discuss later how the metric entropy condition can be checked
by combinatorial arguments.
In some cases we consider a class of probability functions P, for example we can consider a
neighborhood of the true probability (an approach introduced by Le Cam). The ULLN can be










εkLkL1(Q) ,L,L 1 (Q)
´
= op (n),
for all ε>0, then the ULLN is satisﬁed uniform in P ∈ P, see van der Vaart and Wellner (1996, Th
2.8.1). This result is particularly useful in the context of sequential causality. For an appropriate









≤ 2sup P∈P supl∈L |(Pn − P) l|.
Error bounds and convergence rates
We can obtain more insightful bounds for supl∈L |(Pn − P) l|, using that this variable is concen-






























≥ 1 − δ,
by McDiarmid’s (1989) bounded diﬀerence inequality. The next result, based on Pollard’sw o r k ,




























εkLkL1(Q) ,L,L 1 (Q)
´
dε
where Qn is the class of distribution functions with ﬁnite mass at n arbitrary points {x1,...,xn}.




















εkLkL1(Q) ,L,L 1 (Q)
´
dε.
NOTE: Usually supx1...,xn N (ε,L,ρ n) →∞when ε ↓ 0, and since
R 1
0 ε−rdε < ∞ for all r<1,










Without loss of generality assume that the covering number and the integral are ﬁnite. Applying
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#
+2 P (F · I (F>M ))
where LM = {l · I (F ≤ M):l ∈ L}, for all M>0 by the triangle inequality, see e.g. van der







an appropriate class of n-dimensional vectors b. This expectation can be bounded using diﬀerent
techniques of covering numbers (for example, uniform covering numbers, random covering numbers,
bracketing numbers, etc.), and applying the associated Dudley’s entropy integrals.
We deﬁne
LM (Pn)={b ∈ Rn : ∃l ∈ LM,b i = l(Xi),i=1 ,...,n}
and consider d(b,b0)=n−1 Pn
i=1 |bi − b0
i|, so that the isometry between (LM (Pn),d) and (LM,ρ n)
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,
and I study the expression on the right using the Kolmogorov chaining trick.
Let us deﬁne a sequence {Lk} such that Lk is a minimal cover of LM (Pn) of radius 2−k, increasing
to the value k = M such that LM is a minimal covering of radius 1 for the set LM (Pn). For each
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and the number of such pairs is bounded by |Lk|| L k−1| = N
¡
2−k,LM (Pn),d
¢2 (see e.g. Lugosi,
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25using that N (ε,LM (Pn),d) is a monotonously decreasing function of ε. Finally, since PL < ∞,





L(Pn)={b ∈ Rn : ∃l ∈ L,b i = l(Xi),i=1 ,...,n}.




. The expectation of supl∈L |(Pn − P) l|





















This proves the ﬁrst part of the theorem.
For the second part, consider that
sup
l∈L
|(Pn − P) l| ≤ sup
l∈LM








|(Pn − P) l|
¸















P (F · I (F>M ))
then apply the same type of argument.
END-PROOF
The only issue is to compute the covering number N (ε,L,ρ n). We use the combinatorial method
introduced by Vapnik and Chervonenkis (1974) and Vapnik (1998). For a given class A of subsets
of Rd, for an arbitrary set xn
1 = {x1,...,xn} of n points in Rd,w ed e ﬁne
∆A (x1,...,xn)=card{{x1,...,xn} ∩ A : A ∈ A}.
Then, the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) n-shatter coeﬃcient of A as the maximal number of diﬀerent
subsets of a set of n points {x1,...,xn} which can be obtained by intersecting it with the elements
of A,
SA (n)=s u p
©
∆A (x1,...,xn):x1,...,xn ∈ Rdª
.




n : ∃A ∈ A : bi = I (xi ∈ A)}. The Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension (or
index) of the set A is deﬁned as
VA =i n f{n ≥ 1:SA (n) < 2n},
26and V = ∞ if SA (n)=2 n for all n. Note that if SA (n) < 2n then SA (m) < 2m for all m>n
and the VC dimension is well deﬁned. We say that A is a VC class if VA < ∞. The speciﬁc
value VA depends on the complexity of the considered model A, and it has been computed for
commonly used parametrized sets, see e.g. Devroye et al. (1996, Chapter 13). For example, if
A = {x : g (x) ≥ 0,g∈ G} and G is an m−dimensional vector space of real valued functions deﬁned
on Rd, then VA ≤ m. If A is the class of all linear half-spaces in Rd, the VC dimension is d +2 . If
A is the class of all closed balls in Rd, the VC dimension is d +1 . If A is the class of rectangles in
Rd, the VC dimension is 2d.
By deﬁnition, a VC class of sets picks out strictly less than 2n subsets from any set of n ≥ VA
elements, however in practice the value is much slower than the 2n−1 possible ones. Sauer’s lemma






for all n, implying a that SA (n) ≤ (n +1 )
VA for all
n,a n da l s ot h a tSA (n) ≤ (ne/VA)




and VC dimension are be related. Applying the Sauer lemma, Dudley (1978) proved that if A has
VC dimension VA < ∞, then




Haussler (1995) reﬁned the bound to N (ε,A,ρ n) ≤ e(VA +1 )
¡
2e/ε2¢VA .
To apply these results in the context of the class of real valued functions L,w ed e ﬁne the subgraph
of a function l ∈ L as the set {(t,x):t<l(x)}. Then the VC dimension of the function class L is
deﬁned as the VC dimension of all the subgraphs of functions l in L, denoted by VL. In particular,
when L = {I (Aθ ∩ Bc
θ):θ ∈ Θ}, i.e. it is deﬁned by indicator functions, then the subgraph VC
dimension of L is equal to the VC dimension of the class of sets family A = {(Aθ ∩ Bc
θ):θ ∈ Θ}.
When smooth parametric classes L are considered we should compute the VC dimension directly,
but VL has been already computed in the nonparametric literature for the most commonly used














the supremum over all probabilities Q such that kLkLp(Q) > 0 (the proof can be found in van der












27for a universal constant C>0. Under this premise, with probability 1 − δ,






















with probability 1 − δ.
























see Devroye and Lugosi (2001, Th. 3.1.), and by McDiarmid’s (1989) inequality,
















for VC classes by the Sauer









using Talagrand’s (1996 a, b) concentration
inequality instead of McDiarmid’s (1989) one. Talagrand’s (1996 a, b) concentration inequality
guaranties that, with probability 1 − δ,
sup
l∈L





















2 . The advantage of Talagrand’s inequality is that it can be used to control
oscillations of the empirical process locally. Assume that Va r(l) ≤ c(Pl)
α , for some c,α > 0 and
all l ∈ L,s ot h a t
Va r(l) ≤ c(CP (l)+Pl∗)
α .
For example, Va r(l)=Pl = CP (l)+Pl∗ when l is deﬁned by indicator function of Borel sets.
Then, if we deﬁne the set Lr = {l ∈ L : CP (l) ≤ r}, and φn (L,r)=E
£
supl∈Lr |(Pn − P) l|
¤
, we
have that with probability at least 1 − δ,
sup
l∈Lr
|(Pn − P) l| ≤ φn (L,r)+
s













28We denote two times the right hand side of the inequality by ϕn (r);it is an increasing nonnegative
function. Therefore, for all l ∈ Lr,
CP (l) ≤ 2s u p
l∈Lr
|(Pn − P) l| ≤ ϕn (r)
Applying this argument to the subclass Lr containing all functions with ε-tolerances less than that






T a k i n gas m a l l e rr we can improve the bound. The sharpest bound is obtained by considering a





n with probability at least 1 − δ, which can be
formally proved applying the arguments in Massart and Nédélec (2006) and Koltchinskii (2006).
Parametric and semiparametric estimation
As I have previously discussed, causal models can be deﬁned by classes of measurable sets A =
{(Aθ ∩ Bc
θ):θ ∈ Θ}, and/or classes of functions L = {lθ : θ ∈ Θ} with P (Aθ ∩ Bc
θ)=E [lθ], (the
simplest case is lθ = I (Aθ ∩ Bc
θ)). Let us deﬁne the optimal parameter θ
∗ = {θ ∈ Θ : lθ = l∗}, and
the estimator b θn =
n
θ ∈ Θ : lb θn = b ln
o
. Next I discuss the consistency of the parametric estimators
and the convergence rate.
We will assume that the parameter set Θ belongs to a separable semi-metric space with a pseudo-
distance d (which may be perfectly dependent on the unknown distribution P). In a variety of cases,
the pseudo-distance and the causality tolerance are related in such way that CP (lθ) ≥ c · d(θ,θ
∗)







, and the measurable envelope







≤ 2k · P [|lθ − lθ∗|]=2 k · P (lθ − lθ∗)=2 k · CP (l),
and the inequality holds with c =1 /2k. If d2 ¡
θ,θ
0¢







≤ 2k · CP (l).
The condition CP (lθ) ≥ c · d2 (θ,θ
∗) implies that θ
∗ is locally identiﬁed as a minimum of CP (lθ)
(i.e., ∀ε>0, ∃η>0 such that infd(θ,θ∗)>ε CP (lθ) >η ,considering η = cε2). These bounds,
combined with bounds for the expected value of the empirical process modulus of continuity, can be
used to obtain consistency and convergence rates:
29Theorem: Assume that for all θ ∈ Θ, there exists a constant C>0,
CP (lθ) ≥ c · d2 (θ,θ
∗).












for functions ζn (δ) such that δ 7−→ ζn (δ)/δ
α is decreasing for some α<2 not depending on
n. If r2
n · ζn (1/rn)=O(
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for functions γn (δ) such that δ 7−→ γn (δ)/δ
α is decreasing for some α<2 not depending on
n. If r2
n · γn (1/rn)=O(
√























Pn lθ ≤ inf
θ∈Θ



























CP (lθ) − sup
d(θ,θ∗)>ε/rn
(Pn − P)( lθ − lθ∗) ≤ 0
)
using that



































30Since ζn (cδ) ≤ cαζn (δ) for all c>1 by the assumption on ζn, the result follows. For a consistency
result, it suﬃces that supθ∈Θ |(Pn − P)( lθ∗ − lθ)| →p 0 which holds if L is a Glivenko-Cantelly class
(i.e., ULLN holds).






















2s−1<rnd(θ,θ∗)<2s Pn (lθ − lθ∗) ≤ 0
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The expression tends to zero for ε →∞(as S →∞ ).
END-PROOF
Remark:B yt h eﬁxed point reﬁnement obtained from the Talagrand’s inequality, teh assumption
d(θ,θ






≤ c · ϕn (r∗
n)=c · r∗
n









It is usually easier to obtain faster convergence rates when L contains smooth functions with
moderate complexity. For example, if we study the events (4) and consider the function lθ (X)=
H (gθ (X)|X) − H (gθ (X),f θ (X)|X), with θ ∈ Θ ⊂ RK a n dak n o w ns m o o t hc u m u l a t i v ed i s -
tribution H (ε, |X), the parameter solving minθ∈Θ Pl θ can be studied using the standard theory
of M-estimators, and consistency at
√
n rate can be easily derived. However, the speciﬁcation of
H is a risky assumption for an unobservable variable, by contrast to more ﬂexible semiparametric
approaches. When non-smooth functions L are considered, e.g. if L = {I (Aθ)(1− I (Bθ)) : θ ∈ Θ},
31the consistency of b θ is harder to obtain, and even if we can prove consistency the convergence rate
can be too slow. In this context, we can consider smooth functions to improve it, e.g. considering
the approximation (5).
Unfortunately, models L with a ﬁnite VC dimension are often too small, and we can easily ﬁnd
classes with inﬁnite VC dimension (e.g., when Θ belongs to an inﬁnito-dimensional separable metric
space). In these cases, we can consider an approximation method penalizing complexity. A simple
alternative is the sieves method, where I consider an increasing sequence a sequence {Lk} ⊂ L
monotonously increasing to L, and all of the Lk with ﬁnite VC dimension. For example, in the
parametric model LΘ I can consider {Lk} as the constraint of L to Θk for a sequence of ﬁnito-
dimensional subspaces Θk increasing to Θ. Thus, the sieves method solves
Pn l → min,l ∈ Lk.
The solution b lnk is compared with that of {Pl: l ∈ Lk}. Let us deﬁne
Ck (l)=Pl − min
l∈Lk
Pl ,
















both terms are playing the role of bias and variance, respectively. Note that infl∈Lk (Pl − Pl ∗) → 0





almost surely when k →∞ . To ensure that both components tend to zero, typically we require
that k = kn increases with the sample size at a particular rate, and kn is known as the smoothing








, so that setting kn such that
p




→a.s. 0. For example, in the context of
smoothed models like (5), we can consider that L is indexed by a smoothing parameter h, letting
h ↓ 0 with n →∞in such way that nhn →∞we can usually obtain consistency, and we can
also obtain fast convergence rates for the estimator b θn in classes of events {(Aθ ∩ Bc
θ):θ ∈ Θ} with
moderate complexity. This is essentially a semiparametric procedure.
Alternatively, if we consider an upper bound πk (l) ≥ infl∈Lk Pl − Pl ∗, then an alternative to
the sieves approach is the regularization method, deﬁning b lnk as the minimizer of the penalized
functional,
Pn l + πk (l) → min,l ∈ L.
32These ideas can be connected to the literature on classiﬁcation theory, see e.g. Boucheron, Bousquet
and Lugosi (2005), Devroye et al. (1996, Chapter 18).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The notion or probabilistic causation is commonly used by scientists and laymen who arguably
based their use on data based inferences. Interestingly, causality statements are usually avoided by
statisticians who prefer to use association notions. For example, Lindley and Novick (1981) avoid
its use because “causality, although widely used does not seem to be well-deﬁned”. Speed (1990)
suggests that “considerations of causality should be treated as they have always been treated ins
statistics: preferable not at all but, if necessary, with very great care.” The concept of probabilistic
causal inference is perhaps one of the most diﬃcult and important issues in probability and statistics.
It has deep consequences for scientiﬁc analysis, and for the manipulation of cause factors. This paper
presents a valid approach to deal with this topic.
Science is build for the sake of curiosity, as humans usually like to learn about causal relation-
ships. But science is also developed with operational aims, and particularly to obtain optimal results
indirectly through the use of causal relationships. Some philosophers even deﬁne causality as rela-
tionships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control, i.e. A causes
B if we can manipulate A to change B. This idea is the cornerstone of manipulability theories of
causation. It is also advocated in experimental design, where causal relationships are associated to
situations where an eﬀect is manipulated varying the cause factor.
Causality operations can be designed optimally. Consider a family of causal relationships {(Az,B z)}z∈Z
where Az ⇒ Bz for all z ∈ Z, and we have the possibility of setting z ∈ Z. Then we can consider
the optimal decision
max{U (Bz):z ∈ Z}.
where U (·) is a utility function. In the context of probabilistic causation, if we assume that Az
causes Bz almost surely for all z ∈ Z, and we have the possibility of setting z ∈ Z,t h e nw ec a n
consider the stochastic optimization problem
max{U (Bz):z ∈ Z,P(Az ∩ Bc
z)=0 },
where U (·) is a utility function for uncertain results, e.g. we can consider a expected utility approach
33with U (Bz)=
R
Bz udP. In a similar way we can consider ε-causality,
max{U (Bz):z ∈ Z,P(Az ∩ Bc
z) ≤ ε}.
The numerical solution of these problems can be addressed using stochastic optimization based on
scenario approaches.
For example, consider a probability space (Ω,F,P) where P has positive measure at a ﬁnite







































. This problem can be solved using numerical algorithms for
mixed integer programming.
APPENDIX A: CONDITIONAL PROBABILISTIC CAUSATION
Physical laws can be described at diﬀerent coarse levels of detail.There might be causal relation-
ships that are valid relatively to a speciﬁc level of analytical detail, but not in general. To deﬁne
ﬁner structures, we can use a conditional probability with respect to some event C with P (C) > 0.
Therefore, I deﬁne:
Deﬁnition Conditional causality. Given a probability space (Ω,F,P), for any sets A,B ∈ F I
say A causes B almost surely conditioned to C ∈ F with P (C) > 0 if, P (A ∩ Bc|C)=0a.s.
(or equivalently if E [I (A) · I (Bc)|C]=0a.s.), and I denote it by A
a.s.[P|C]
⇒ B.
The condition P (A ∩ Bc|C)=0 , is equivalent to P ((A ∩ C) ∩ Bc)=0 , and whenever P (A) > 0 it
is equivalent to P (C ∩ Bc|A)=0 .I no t h e rw o r d s ,i fA,C have non null probability, then A
a.s.[P|C]
⇒ B
if and only if C
a.s.[P|A]
⇒ B if and only if (A ∩ C)
a.s.[P]
⇒ B. Therefore conditional probabilistic causality
is just a form of unconditional causality, and the use of a conditioning event C simply imposes a
restriction A∩C over the causal event A. However, for testing purposes E [I (A) · (1 − I (B))|C]=0
the use of conditional causality can lead to alternative statistical procedures, particularly when
random variables and/or stochastic processes are considered.
34The almost surely conditional causality can be relaxed. Given a probability space (Ω,F,P), for
any sets A,B ∈ F and any   ∈ (0,1),Is a yt h a tA causes B in terms of  −probabilistic causality
conditioned to C ∈ F with P (C) > 0, if P (A ∩ Bc|C) ≤  . The minimum value   is the C-
conditional ε-tolerance. Notice that if A,C have non null probability, then
P (A ∩ Bc|C)=










P (C ∩ Bc|A);
so that P (A ∩ Bc|C) ≤   if and only if P (A ∩ C ∩ Bc) ≤  P (C), or equivalently if
P (C ∩ Bc|A) ≤  P (C)/P (A).
Therefore, if P (A ∩ Bc|C) ≤   with 0 <P(C) ≤ P (A), I conclude that P (C ∩ Bc|A) ≤  .
In many instances, ε-probabilistic causality can be only obtained conditional to certain levels of
detail. But, since conditional probabilistic causality is just a form of probabilistic unconditional
causality from A ∩ C to B, I will not stress this case in this paper.
APPENDIX B: ROBUSTNESS
Next we discus the robustness of probabilistic and sequential causality against changes probability
measurement. Given a measurable space (Ω,F), consider two probability measures P, Q. Assume
that A
a.s.[P]
⇒ B, under which conditions is it straightforwardly satisﬁed that A
a.s.[Q]
⇒ B without the
need of further checking? The answer lies on the notion of absolutely continuity.
We say that a probability measure Q is absolutely continuous with respect to the probability
measure P, both probability distributions deﬁned on (Ω,F), if P (A)=0implies that Q(A)=0
for all set A ∈ F.T h i s i sd e n o t e d b y Q< <P .Furthermore P and Q are orthogonal if Ω can be
partitioned in two disjoint sets ΩP, ΩQ such that P (ΩQ)=0=Q(ΩP), and denoted by P ⊥ Q.
For any A,B ∈ F,
• if Q< <Pthen A
a.s.[P]
⇒ B implies that A
a.s.[Q]
⇒ B,
• if Q< <Pand P< <Qthen A
a.s.[P]
⇒ B if and only if A
a.s.[Q]
⇒ B
In general P and Q have no need to be neither absolutely continuous nor orthogonal. Assume
that Q, P are absolutely continuous with respect to a measure µ deﬁned on (Ω,F), then the Radon-
Nikodym derivatives with respect to µ (densities) p, q exist (where p and q are measurable functions
deﬁned from Ω → [0,∞), such that P (A)=
R
A pdµ and Q(A)=
R
A qdµ for any set A ∈ F). The
35Lebesgue decomposition states that we can decompose Q = Qac + Q⊥ where Qac << P and Q⊥ is
orthogonal with respect to P. It is given by
Qac (A)=Q(A ∩ {p>0}),Q ⊥ (A)=Q(A ∩ {p =0 }),
for all measurable set A, and the orthogonality is satisﬁed setting ΩP = {p>0} and ΩQ = {q>0}.







w h e r ew es e tq/p =1if p = q =0and p/q = ∞ if p>q=0 . The expression q/p is the
likelihood ratio, and it is equal to the Radon-Nikodym derivative dQac/dP (Q- a.s.). Clearly, Q⊥
is the component that generates incongruences between causality relationships based on Q and P.
If Q< <Pthen Q⊥ is the null measure and the a.s. causality relationships are invariant to this
change of probabilities. Otherwise the maximum distortion is bounded by Q⊥ (Ω). Note that Q< <
P if and only if Q(p =0 )=0if and only if
R
(q/p)dP =1 . Therefore a measurement of relative







(1 − (q/p))dP ≥ 0.
In particular, assume that P (A ∩ Bc)=0 , if T (A ∩ Bc)=
R
A∩Bc (1 − (q/p))dP =0the result is
also true under Q.
Next we discus the invariance of sequential causality relationships under changes of probability
measurement. Consider a sequence {(Ω,Fn,P n)}
∞
n=1 , and {An} causes B sequentially for {Pn}.
Assume that an alternative researcher develops an alternative theoretical and experimental procedure
that generates the sequence {(Ω,Fn,Q n)}
∞
n=1 . When can we assure that A causes B sequentially
for {Qn}, provided that this happens for {Pn}? The key idea is the notion of contiguity, developed
by Le Cam (1960, 1985). A sequence of probability measures {Qn} is contiguous with respect to
other sequence {Pn} if limn→∞ Pn (An)=0implies that limn→∞ Qn (An)=0 , for every sequence of
measurable events An, and this is denoted by QnCPn. Is a yt h a tPn and Qn are mutually contiguous
if QnCPn and PnCQn, and this is denoted by QnCBPn. For any {An} with An ∈ Fn, and Bn ∈ F,
• if QnCPn then {An} asymptotically causes Bn sequentially respect to {Pn}, implies the same
with respect to {Qn}
• if Qn CB Pn. then {An} asymptotically causes Bn sequentially respect to {Pn}, if and only if
the same is true with respect to {Qn}.
36We can characterize contiguity when there is a measure µ such that Pn and Qn are absolutely
continuous with respect to µ for all n,w i t hpn = dPn/dµ and qn = dQn/dµ. We deﬁne dQn/dPn =
qn/pn if pn > 0,d Q n/dPn =1if pn = qn =0and equal to inﬁnite if pn >q n =0 . Given a sequence
of measurable functions {fn},f all of them deﬁned from Ω → Rk, we denote the weak convergence
with respect to the probability measures {Pn} by fn −→ w.[Pn] f. The ﬁrst Lemma of Le Cam states
that the following statements are equivalent, (1) Qn C Pn, (2) If dPn/dQn −→ w.[Qn] U along a
subsequence, then P (U>0) = 1, (3) If dQn/dPn −→ w.[Pn] V along a subsequence, then E [V ]=1 ,
(4) for any statistics Tn : Ω → Rk, if Tn
Pn −→ 0 then Tn
Qn −→ 0. T h ep r o o fc a nb ef o u n di nv a nd e r
Vaart (1998, Chap. 6).
We deﬁne the expression Tn (A)=
R
A (1 − (qn/pn))dPn. Then Tn (A ∩ Bc) is a measurement of
relative consistency of {Pn} sequential causation with respect to the measures Qn. The sequence
Tn (Ω) −→ w.[Pn] T =1− E [V ]=0iﬀ Qn C Pn.
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